feat(security): SSRF guard on fetch_url + single-use tool-approval tokens

Two tool/agent-layer hardening changes:

* fetch_url now resolves the target host and refuses to connect if any
  resolved address is loopback, private (RFC1918/ULA), link-local (incl. the
  169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint), multicast, reserved, or
  unspecified. IPv4-mapped IPv6 is unwrapped first, and the guard re-runs on
  every redirect hop so a public URL cannot 302 its way to an internal target.

* /chat/approve now requires a single-use token minted when the stream pauses
  for approval and delivered only in that stream's tool_request event, compared
  in constant time. Previously the pending approval was keyed solely on a
  client-supplied conversation_id, so anyone who could enumerate a
  conversation_id could approve another client's pending action.

The frontend threads the token from the tool_request event into the approve
call.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

interface/web/src/Chatbot.jsx

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ export function Chatbot({ conversationId, setConversationId, onConversationChang
   const [images, setImages] = useState([]); // {name, b64} for vision models
   const [activeTool, setActiveTool] = useState(null); // playbook tool currently running
   const [pendingApproval, setPendingApproval] = useState(null); // [{name, arguments}] awaiting yes/no
+  const [approvalToken, setApprovalToken] = useState(null); // single-use token authorizing /chat/approve
   const [editingIdx, setEditingIdx] = useState(null); // user message being edited
   const [editText, setEditText] = useState("");
   const [listening, setListening] = useState(false); // mic dictation active
@@ -286,7 +287,11 @@ export function Chatbot({ conversationId, setConversationId, onConversationChang
               continue;
             }
             if (pendingEventType === "tool_request") {
-              try { setPendingApproval(JSON.parse(payload)); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+              try {
+                const parsed = JSON.parse(payload);
+                setPendingApproval(parsed.actions || []);
+                setApprovalToken(parsed.token || null);
+              } catch { /* ignore */ }
               pendingEventType = null;
               continue;
             }
@@ -401,13 +406,15 @@ export function Chatbot({ conversationId, setConversationId, onConversationChang
   // Approve or deny the pending action tool(s); the open chat stream resumes.
   const resolveApproval = async (approve) => {
     const req = pendingApproval || [];
+    const token = approvalToken;
     setPendingApproval(null);
+    setApprovalToken(null);
     const decisions = {};
     req.forEach(a => { decisions[a.name] = approve; });
     try {
       await fetch(`${API_BASE}/chat/approve`, {
         method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-        body: JSON.stringify({ conversation_id: conversationId, decisions }),
+        body: JSON.stringify({ conversation_id: conversationId, token, decisions }),
       });
     } catch { /* ignore */ }
   };

management/ncp.py

@@ -112,6 +112,12 @@ class Service:
         return self._argv() if callable(self._argv) else self._argv
 
 
+# Bind loopback by default: the backend/memory REST APIs are unauthenticated, so
+# binding 0.0.0.0 handed the full admin+data plane to any host on the LAN. Set
+# NEXUS_BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0 to opt into LAN exposure once real auth is in place.
+BIND_HOST = os.environ.get("NEXUS_BIND_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+
+
 def _uvicorn(app: str, port: int):
     # No --reload. It is a dev-loop flag: uvicorn's reloader runs a supervisor
     # that spawns the real server as a CHILD, so every service became two
@@ -120,7 +126,7 @@ def _uvicorn(app: str, port: int):
     # terminals for what should have been a silent start. launch_nexus.sh still
     # passes --reload for the Linux dev loop, where a visible console is the
     # point; this launcher is the one users run.
-    return [str(PYTHON), "-m", "uvicorn", app, "--host", "0.0.0.0",
+    return [str(PYTHON), "-m", "uvicorn", app, "--host", BIND_HOST,
             "--port", str(port)]
 
 

synapse/chat.py

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import asyncio
 import json as _json
 import logging
+import secrets
 import threading
 from typing import AsyncGenerator, Dict, List, Optional, Any
 
@@ -171,12 +172,20 @@ async def _run_tool_loop(manager, messages, model, tool_schemas, temperature, nu
         action_calls = [c for c in calls if _tools.is_action(c.get("function", {}).get("name", ""))]
         if policy == "ask" and action_calls:
             event = asyncio.Event()
-            pending_approvals[conversation_id] = {"event": event, "decisions": {}}
-            yield "__approve__" + _json.dumps([
+            # Single-use capability token, delivered only to the client that owns
+            # this stream. /chat/approve requires it, so knowing the (guessable,
+            # enumerable) conversation_id is no longer enough to approve someone
+            # else's pending action.
+            token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+            pending_approvals[conversation_id] = {"event": event, "decisions": {}, "token": token}
+            yield "__approve__" + _json.dumps({
+                "token": token,
+                "actions": [
                     {"name": c.get("function", {}).get("name", ""),
                      "arguments": c.get("function", {}).get("arguments")}
                     for c in action_calls
-            ])
+                ],
+            })
             try:
                 await asyncio.wait_for(event.wait(), timeout=_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT)
                 decisions = pending_approvals[conversation_id]["decisions"]

synapse/main.py

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import asyncio as _asyncio
 import json as _json
+import secrets as _secrets
 import uuid as _uuid
 from collections import Counter as _Counter
 from typing import Any, AsyncGenerator, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
@@ -14,9 +15,10 @@ import platform as _platform
 from pathlib import Path
 from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Body
 from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
+from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware
 from fastapi.responses import StreamingResponse, FileResponse
 
-from .nexus_config import settings, VERSION, DEFAULT_CHAT_MODEL
+from .nexus_config import settings, VERSION, DEFAULT_CHAT_MODEL, ALLOWED_HOSTS, ALLOWED_ORIGINS
 from .chat import generate_chat_response, stream_chat_response, _synapse_trace
 from . import chat as _chat
 from .ollama_manager import initialize_ollama, initialize_ollama_async, get_ollama_manager
@@ -179,13 +181,20 @@ app = FastAPI(title="Synapse Backend", version=VERSION)
 # Alias for startup scripts
 sio_app = app
 
-# --- CORS ---
-# allow_credentials=True is incompatible with allow_origins=["*"] — browsers
-# reject such responses. Since this is a local-only service with no cookies/auth,
-# wildcard origins without credentials is correct.
+# --- Local-access guard ---
+# These APIs are unauthenticated and meant for this machine only. Two layers:
+#   1. TrustedHostMiddleware rejects a foreign Host header, which is what defeats
+#      DNS-rebinding — the browser treats a rebound attacker domain as
+#      same-origin, so CORS alone can't stop it.
+#   2. CORS is scoped to known local origins (not "*"), so a malicious page can't
+#      read responses cross-origin from the victim's browser.
+# NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS=* / a custom NEXUS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS opts into LAN exposure,
+# and should only be used once real authentication is in front of these apps.
+if "*" not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
+    app.add_middleware(TrustedHostMiddleware, allowed_hosts=ALLOWED_HOSTS)
 app.add_middleware(
     CORSMiddleware,
-    allow_origins=["*"],
+    allow_origins=ALLOWED_ORIGINS,
     allow_credentials=False,
     allow_methods=["*"],
     allow_headers=["*"],
@@ -500,12 +509,20 @@ async def chat_stream_endpoint(payload: Dict[str, Any]):
 @app.post("/chat/approve")
 async def chat_approve(payload: Dict[str, Any] = Body(...)):
     """Resolve a pending per-call tool approval. `decisions` maps tool name ->
-    bool; the awaiting chat stream resumes and runs the approved actions."""
+    bool; the awaiting chat stream resumes and runs the approved actions.
+
+    The `token` (issued in the stream's tool_request event) is required: without
+    it, anyone who can guess/enumerate a conversation_id could approve another
+    client's pending action. Compared in constant time."""
     conversation_id = payload.get("conversation_id") or ""
+    token = payload.get("token") or ""
     decisions = payload.get("decisions") or {}
     waiter = _chat.pending_approvals.get(conversation_id)
     if not waiter:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="no pending approval for this conversation")
+    expected = waiter.get("token") or ""
+    if not token or not _secrets.compare_digest(str(token), str(expected)):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="invalid or missing approval token")
     waiter["decisions"] = {k: bool(v) for k, v in decisions.items()}
     waiter["event"].set()
     return {"status": "resumed"}

synapse/memory/service.py

@@ -19,17 +19,24 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
 
 from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Body
 from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
+from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware
 from pydantic import BaseModel
 
 from .store import store, MemoryItem
 from .extractor import extract_memory
 from ..ollama_manager import get_ollama_manager
+from ..nexus_config import ALLOWED_HOSTS, ALLOWED_ORIGINS
 
 app = FastAPI(title="Nexus Memory Service", version="1.0")
 
+# Same unauthenticated-local-only posture as the main backend: reject foreign
+# Host headers (anti DNS-rebind) and scope CORS to known local origins rather
+# than "*". See nexus_config.ALLOWED_HOSTS / ALLOWED_ORIGINS for env overrides.
+if "*" not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
+    app.add_middleware(TrustedHostMiddleware, allowed_hosts=ALLOWED_HOSTS)
 app.add_middleware(
     CORSMiddleware,
-    allow_origins=["*"],
+    allow_origins=ALLOWED_ORIGINS,
     allow_credentials=False,
     allow_methods=["*"],
     allow_headers=["*"],

synapse/nexus_config.py

@@ -143,6 +143,29 @@ class Settings:
             "ollama_timeout": self.ollama_timeout,
         }
 
+# --- local-access allowlists (shared by the backend + memory FastAPI apps) ---
+# The REST APIs are unauthenticated, so they are meant to be reached only from
+# this machine. Two independent browser-side defenses depend on these lists:
+#   * ALLOWED_ORIGINS drives CORS — blocks a malicious page from *reading*
+#     responses cross-origin (was previously "*", which let any site read them).
+#   * ALLOWED_HOSTS drives TrustedHostMiddleware — rejects a foreign Host header,
+#     which is what stops DNS-rebinding (same-origin from the browser's view, so
+#     CORS can't help there).
+# Both accept a comma-separated env override for the intentional-LAN case, to be
+# paired with real auth. NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS=* disables the Host check.
+def _csv_env(name: str, default: list) -> list:
+    raw = os.getenv(name, "").strip()
+    return [p.strip() for p in raw.split(",") if p.strip()] if raw else list(default)
+
+_LOCAL_HOSTS = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]", "::1", "testserver"]
+_LOCAL_ORIGINS = [
+    f"http://{h}:{p}"
+    for h in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1")
+    for p in (8000, 8001, 5173)
+]
+ALLOWED_HOSTS = _csv_env("NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS", _LOCAL_HOSTS)
+ALLOWED_ORIGINS = _csv_env("NEXUS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", _LOCAL_ORIGINS)
+
 # exported instance
 settings = Settings()
 
@@ -152,7 +175,8 @@ __all__ = ["Settings", "settings", "path", "VERSION",
            "PROJECT_ROOT", "DATA_DIR", "MODELS_DIR", "RUNTIME_DIR",
            "MEMORY_DIR", "LOGS_DIR", "PLAYBOOK_DIR", "UPLOADS_DIR",
            "EXPORTS_DIR", "MEMORY_DB",
-           "BACKEND_LOG", "OLLAMA_LOG", "CHAT_LOG"]
+           "BACKEND_LOG", "OLLAMA_LOG", "CHAT_LOG",
+           "ALLOWED_HOSTS", "ALLOWED_ORIGINS"]
            
 # --- quick runtime sanity check when run directly (no side effects on import) ---
 if __name__ == "__main__":

synapse/tools.py

@@ -60,20 +60,83 @@ async def _web_search(query: str = "", **_) -> str:
     return res or "(no results)"
 
 
+_FETCH_MAX_REDIRECTS = 5
+
+
+def _ip_is_blocked(ip: str) -> bool:
+    """True if an address is one an outbound fetch has no business reaching:
+    loopback, RFC1918/ULA private, link-local (incl. 169.254.169.254 cloud
+    metadata), multicast, reserved, or unspecified. IPv4-mapped IPv6 is unwrapped
+    first so ::ffff:127.0.0.1 can't sneak a loopback past the check."""
+    import ipaddress
+    try:
+        addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip.split("%")[0])  # drop any IPv6 zone id
+    except ValueError:
+        return True  # unparseable -> refuse rather than guess
+    mapped = getattr(addr, "ipv4_mapped", None)
+    if mapped is not None:
+        addr = mapped
+    return (
+        addr.is_loopback or addr.is_private or addr.is_link_local
+        or addr.is_multicast or addr.is_reserved or addr.is_unspecified
+    )
+
+
+def _ssrf_guard(host: str) -> str | None:
+    """Resolve a hostname and return an error string if ANY of its A/AAAA
+    records is a blocked address, else None. Checking every answer stops a name
+    from smuggling one private record alongside a public one.
+
+    ponytail: this validates then httpx re-resolves on connect, so a sub-second
+    DNS-rebind could still slip a private address through the TOCTOU gap. That's
+    an advanced attack against a playbook-gated, single-user tool; pin the
+    connection to the resolved IP if this ever faces untrusted callers."""
+    import socket
+    if not host:
+        return "missing host"
+    try:
+        infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None)
+    except socket.gaierror as e:
+        return f"cannot resolve host: {e}"
+    ips = {info[4][0] for info in infos}
+    if not ips:
+        return "host did not resolve"
+    blocked = [ip for ip in ips if _ip_is_blocked(ip)]
+    if blocked:
+        return f"refusing to fetch a private/loopback/link-local address ({', '.join(sorted(blocked))})"
+    return None
+
+
 async def _fetch_url(url: str = "", **_) -> str:
     import re
     import httpx
+    from urllib.parse import urlparse, urljoin
     url = (url or "").strip()
     if not url.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
         return json.dumps({"error": "url must start with http:// or https://"})
-    # ponytail: no SSRF allow/deny-list — local single-user assistant, and the
-    # tool only runs when a playbook explicitly grants fetch_url. Add host
-    # filtering if this ever serves multiple/untrusted users.
+    # SSRF guard: validate the host of the initial URL AND every redirect hop
+    # against the private/loopback/link-local block-list before connecting, so a
+    # granted fetch_url can't be steered at 127.0.0.1:11434, cloud metadata, or
+    # LAN hosts — and a public URL can't 302 its way there either.
     try:
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15.0, follow_redirects=True) as c:
+        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15.0, follow_redirects=False) as c:
+            for _ in range(_FETCH_MAX_REDIRECTS + 1):
+                parsed = urlparse(url)
+                if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+                    return json.dumps({"error": "only http(s) URLs are allowed"})
+                err = _ssrf_guard(parsed.hostname or "")
+                if err:
+                    return json.dumps({"error": f"blocked: {err}"})
                 r = await c.get(url, headers={"User-Agent": "NexusOS/1.0"})
+                location = r.headers.get("location")
+                if r.is_redirect and location:
+                    url = urljoin(url, location)
+                    continue
                 r.raise_for_status()
                 html = r.text
+                break
+            else:
+                return json.dumps({"error": "too many redirects"})
     except Exception as e:
         return json.dumps({"error": f"fetch failed: {e}"})
     text = re.sub(r"(?is)<(script|style).*?</\1>", " ", html)