Commit Graph
10 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
AthenaandClaude Sonnet 5 cb3d3f0a1f feat: vendor Curry, preloaded and callable across the one universal wheel
Vendors curry_core.py from Athena-Pro/Curry (with the str.format()/format_map()
sandbox-escape fix from https://github.com/Athena-Pro/Curry/pull/4 already
applied) into synapse/, since Curry itself isn't a pip-installable package -
it's meant to be pointed at via a config path, which only works from a source
checkout. Vendoring a single self-contained, stdlib-only file ships it inside
NexusOS's own wheel with no extra dependency to reconcile.

synapse/curry_store.py opens it into a module-level singleton (curry_db) at
import time, the same pattern as memory.store.store and
playbooks.store.playbook_store, and main.py imports it so it's genuinely
initialized at process startup - preloaded, not lazy-on-first-use. Backed by
its own CURRY_DB file (nexus_config.py), separate from memory.db.

NexusOS builds exactly one wheel (py3-none-any, no compiled extensions) -
there is no separate Windows/macOS/Linux artifact; platform differences are
handled by requirement overlays at install time, not by building different
wheels. Verified the same wheel actually carries this correctly: built it,
confirmed twine check passes, confirmed synapse/curry_core.py and
curry_store.py are present in the archive (bin/check.sh's packaging gate now
asserts this too), then installed that exact wheel into a throwaway venv and
round-tripped a declare_constant/get_constant_latest call against it with no
source checkout present - proving "preloaded and ready to be called" holds
from the shipped artifact, not just editable-install execution.

Android/Termux is unaffected by this change in either direction: it already
has a separate, documented, pre-existing blocker in docs/TERMUX.md (no
published Android pydantic-core wheel) that has nothing to do with Curry,
which is pure stdlib and adds no new native/binary dependency.

Scope: preload only, nothing wired into a chat-facing tool yet - no model or
user-authored content reaches declare_function/call_function today.

Verified: 216 backend tests pass (4 new in test_curry_store.py, including a
regression test proving the vendored sandbox fix survived the copy); the 12
pre-existing C/C++/Rust toolchain failures are unrelated and unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 21:40:41 -05:00
AthenaandClaude Sonnet 5 0bbe5e200e feat: self-alteration tools (edit_playbook, edit_settings, edit_source)
Gives the assistant three new ACTION tools to change its own playbooks,
runtime settings, and (source checkout only) its own source code, all
reusing the existing run_snippet/remember approval framework — but with
a hardcoded floor (self_edit.ALWAYS_ASK_TOOLS) so these three always pause
for per-call human approval regardless of the global action_tool_policy
setting. Flipping that policy for an unrelated tool must never silently
also unlock unattended self-modification.

synapse/self_edit.py is the new module doing the actual work, documented
in the same explicit "here's what is and isn't a security boundary" style
as code_run.py:
  - edit_source is confined to settings.project_root via the same
    realpath + Path.parents boundary check that just closed a sibling-
    directory bypass in /icons/image, plus a denylist of dangerous
    subtrees (.git, the venv, node_modules, build output, runtime state).
    Gated on settings.source_checkout — refuses cleanly in a wheel
    install, where there's no live repo to edit or commit into.
  - The model sends full file content, never a diff; the server computes
    the diff itself via difflib against what's actually on disk, so a
    human reviews ground truth, not a description the model wrote.
  - Every applied source edit best-effort commits to git as an audit
    trail — independent of, not a substitute for, the approval gate.
  - edit_playbook merges instead of replacing (main.py's prior
    _persist_playbook did a raw replace, which was only safe because the
    frontend form always sent a complete object — unsafe for a tool a
    model calls with a partial argument set, so this also fixes that
    latent bug). Becoming the active system prompt requires an explicit
    make_active flag, never a side effect of an ordinary edit.
  - edit_settings reuses the existing _SETTINGS_DEFAULTS allowlist.

The approval UI (Chatbot.jsx) previously rendered a tool call's arguments
as Object.values(args).join(", ") in a single-line badge — unusable for
reviewing a diff. It now renders a real, server-computed preview (diff
for source, before/after for playbook/settings) via a new shared
diff-view.js helper, with a loud banner when a change would become the
active system prompt or touch action_tool_policy/system_prompt. A new
nexus-edit fence (self-edit-langs.js + Markdown.jsx's EditBlock) shows
the same diff after an edit is applied, mirroring nexus-run.

Verified: 212 backend tests pass (29 new in test_self_edit.py; the 12
pre-existing C/C++/Rust toolchain failures are unrelated and unchanged),
57 frontend node:test cases pass (15 new), eslint and vite build clean,
and the full approval-preview render path was exercised against the real
built UI with a mocked SSE stream covering all four preview branches
(source diff, playbook becomes-main, settings policy-change, and a
rejected/failing preview).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 20:13:35 -05:00
AthenaandClaude Sonnet 5 50738b139a fix(security): close icons path-prefix bypass, log swallowed exceptions
/icons/image used a bare string startswith() against allowed roots, so
a sibling dir like /usr/share/icons_evil would pass as if it were under
/usr/share/icons. Switched to the pathlib parents-based check already
used correctly in icons/compositor.py, plus a regression test.

Also stopped three bare `except Exception: pass` blocks (auto model
select fallback, conversation titling) from swallowing errors silently
- they now log to the existing chat trace helper. Behavior unchanged,
just visible when something's actually failing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 19:26:08 -05:00
Athena 646af18c7d feat: add portable NexusOS CLI and packaging 2026-08-20 02:00:52 -05:00
Athena 4269a2f44f fix(preview): harden sandbox and transformation 2026-08-20 01:10:06 -05:00
AthenaandCursor d45ce69b38 fix(runtime): improve local service reliability
Close SQLite handles safely on Windows, clean orphaned vectors, normalize Ollama endpoints, and surface model errors without leaking reasoning tags.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-20 00:52:08 -05:00
AthenaandCursor 00bd43d32e feat(preview): add sandboxed live code previews
Render validated HTML, SVG, JSX, and TSX fences locally while preserving tool context and preventing explanatory JSON from triggering actions.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-20 00:51:29 -05:00
AthenaandCursor 4a7451f5f5 feat(security): request-size caps, concurrency limits, model-pull allowlist
DoS/quota guardrails for the unauthenticated local APIs:

* Body-size middleware rejects oversized requests (Content-Length) before they
  are buffered/base64-decoded (NEXUS_MAX_REQUEST_MB, default 32).
* Document upload enforces a decoded-byte cap (NEXUS_MAX_UPLOAD_MB, default 20)
  and a PDF page-count cap (NEXUS_MAX_PDF_PAGES, default 500) as backstops for
  chunked bodies and pathological files.
* A counter-based in-flight limiter bounds concurrent chats and document
  ingests (NEXUS_MAX_CONCURRENT_CHATS/UPLOADS), returning 429 when saturated;
  the chat slot is held for the whole SSE stream and released on completion or
  client disconnect.
* /models/pull gains an opt-in allowlist (NEXUS_MODEL_ALLOWLIST); empty by
  default so behaviour is unchanged, otherwise a bare repo name permits all its
  tags.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-07 09:41:53 -05:00
AthenaandCursor 1f6beed0d2 feat(security): SSRF guard on fetch_url + single-use tool-approval tokens
Two tool/agent-layer hardening changes:

* fetch_url now resolves the target host and refuses to connect if any
  resolved address is loopback, private (RFC1918/ULA), link-local (incl. the
  169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint), multicast, reserved, or
  unspecified. IPv4-mapped IPv6 is unwrapped first, and the guard re-runs on
  every redirect hop so a public URL cannot 302 its way to an internal target.

* /chat/approve now requires a single-use token minted when the stream pauses
  for approval and delivered only in that stream's tool_request event, compared
  in constant time. Previously the pending approval was keyed solely on a
  client-supplied conversation_id, so anyone who could enumerate a
  conversation_id could approve another client's pending action.

The frontend threads the token from the tool_request event into the approve
call.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-07 09:41:09 -05:00
AthenaandCursor fe12eb1821 feat(security): bind services to loopback with Host + CORS allowlists
The Synapse backend and memory service bound 0.0.0.0 with wildcard CORS and no
auth, exposing the full unauthenticated admin/data API to the LAN. Default the
uvicorn bind to 127.0.0.1 (NEXUS_BIND_HOST override), scope CORS to known local
origins instead of "*", and add TrustedHostMiddleware to reject foreign Host
headers (which defeats DNS-rebinding, something same-origin CORS cannot stop).

NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS / NEXUS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS allow opt-in LAN exposure, intended
to be paired with real authentication.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-07 09:40:12 -05:00