Adds synapse/slash_commands.py: a chat message that's nothing but
/tool_name(arg=val, arg=val) dispatches straight through tools.dispatch(),
skipping model selection, RAG/playbook context assembly, and the ask-policy
approval round-trip entirely. A human typing this IS the approval - there's
no one else to ask - so it's a deliberate, reviewed bypass of the approval
step specifically, not of anything a tool validates internally (path
boundaries, size caps, Curry's own sandbox checks all still run). Argument
values parse via ast.literal_eval only: strings/numbers/bools/None/literal
containers, no names, no calls, no attribute access - a malformed or
hostile-looking argument fails to parse rather than executing anything.
Wired into chat_stream_endpoint (main.py) as an early short-circuit, before
any of the RAG/model-selection work that a slash-command doesn't need. Web
needed no changes (it already forwards raw text unchanged); the TUI
previously swallowed every leading "/" locally and never reached the backend
with it, so tui_app.py's _handle_slash now falls through to _start_chat for
anything shaped like a tool call while still handling its own local
meta-commands (/help, /model, /new, ...) exactly as before.
Also finally wires Curry in as ten real tools (curry_declare_constant,
curry_get_constant/_latest, curry_list_constants, curry_retire_constant,
curry_declare_function, curry_get_function, curry_list_functions,
curry_call_function, curry_retire_function) - deferred from the vendoring
pass. The five write/execute ones are ACTION tools in the same
always-ask-regardless-of-global-policy floor as edit_source
(ALWAYS_ASK_ACTION_TOOLS, generalized in tools.py from the old
self_edit-only ALWAYS_ASK_TOOLS so future tool families share one place to
register into). curry_call_function is gated as an action for the same
reason run_snippet is: it executes code, even sandboxed.
Fixed a real bug surfaced while wiring this up: curry_db is a long-lived
singleton holding one sqlite3 connection (unlike NexusOS's own memory store,
which opens/closes a fresh connection per call specifically to dodge this),
and sqlite3 forbids using a connection from a different thread than created
it. That's a non-issue in production (uvicorn's single event-loop thread),
but Starlette's TestClient runs the ASGI app through an anyio portal thread,
so it broke immediately under test. Fixed at the source (curry_core.py,
Curry.__init__) with check_same_thread=False, documented as a second
deliberate vendoring deviation alongside the PR #4 sandbox fix - there was
never real concurrent access here, just an overly strict same-thread
assertion tripping on a thread-identity change with only one logical caller.
Verified: 244 backend tests pass (18 new for the parser + endpoint wiring +
curry tool registration, 4 new for the TUI passthrough); the 12 pre-existing
C/C++/Rust toolchain failures are unrelated and unchanged. Confirmed by hand
over the real HTTP endpoint: successful dispatch, zero tool_request events
(approval bypass working as designed), a format()-dunder exploit attempt
still rejected by the vendored sandbox fix even through the new tool
registration, malformed arguments rejected before ever reaching dispatch,
and an unknown tool name rejected cleanly. Wheel rebuilt and content-checked
(bin/check.sh's gate now also asserts slash_commands.py ships).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Vendors curry_core.py from Athena-Pro/Curry (with the str.format()/format_map()
sandbox-escape fix from https://github.com/Athena-Pro/Curry/pull/4 already
applied) into synapse/, since Curry itself isn't a pip-installable package -
it's meant to be pointed at via a config path, which only works from a source
checkout. Vendoring a single self-contained, stdlib-only file ships it inside
NexusOS's own wheel with no extra dependency to reconcile.
synapse/curry_store.py opens it into a module-level singleton (curry_db) at
import time, the same pattern as memory.store.store and
playbooks.store.playbook_store, and main.py imports it so it's genuinely
initialized at process startup - preloaded, not lazy-on-first-use. Backed by
its own CURRY_DB file (nexus_config.py), separate from memory.db.
NexusOS builds exactly one wheel (py3-none-any, no compiled extensions) -
there is no separate Windows/macOS/Linux artifact; platform differences are
handled by requirement overlays at install time, not by building different
wheels. Verified the same wheel actually carries this correctly: built it,
confirmed twine check passes, confirmed synapse/curry_core.py and
curry_store.py are present in the archive (bin/check.sh's packaging gate now
asserts this too), then installed that exact wheel into a throwaway venv and
round-tripped a declare_constant/get_constant_latest call against it with no
source checkout present - proving "preloaded and ready to be called" holds
from the shipped artifact, not just editable-install execution.
Android/Termux is unaffected by this change in either direction: it already
has a separate, documented, pre-existing blocker in docs/TERMUX.md (no
published Android pydantic-core wheel) that has nothing to do with Curry,
which is pure stdlib and adds no new native/binary dependency.
Scope: preload only, nothing wired into a chat-facing tool yet - no model or
user-authored content reaches declare_function/call_function today.
Verified: 216 backend tests pass (4 new in test_curry_store.py, including a
regression test proving the vendored sandbox fix survived the copy); the 12
pre-existing C/C++/Rust toolchain failures are unrelated and unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Separate bind and client addresses, include Ollama's response body in HTTP failures, and strip inline <think> blocks from complete and streamed replies.
Repair vector rows left behind by older databases at store startup. Keep the existing single-statement delete path from main and avoid reintroducing the redundant batched helper.
DoS/quota guardrails for the unauthenticated local APIs:
* Body-size middleware rejects oversized requests (Content-Length) before they
are buffered/base64-decoded (NEXUS_MAX_REQUEST_MB, default 32).
* Document upload enforces a decoded-byte cap (NEXUS_MAX_UPLOAD_MB, default 20)
and a PDF page-count cap (NEXUS_MAX_PDF_PAGES, default 500) as backstops for
chunked bodies and pathological files.
* A counter-based in-flight limiter bounds concurrent chats and document
ingests (NEXUS_MAX_CONCURRENT_CHATS/UPLOADS), returning 429 when saturated;
the chat slot is held for the whole SSE stream and released on completion or
client disconnect.
* /models/pull gains an opt-in allowlist (NEXUS_MODEL_ALLOWLIST); empty by
default so behaviour is unchanged, otherwise a bare repo name permits all its
tags.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Two tool/agent-layer hardening changes:
* fetch_url now resolves the target host and refuses to connect if any
resolved address is loopback, private (RFC1918/ULA), link-local (incl. the
169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint), multicast, reserved, or
unspecified. IPv4-mapped IPv6 is unwrapped first, and the guard re-runs on
every redirect hop so a public URL cannot 302 its way to an internal target.
* /chat/approve now requires a single-use token minted when the stream pauses
for approval and delivered only in that stream's tool_request event, compared
in constant time. Previously the pending approval was keyed solely on a
client-supplied conversation_id, so anyone who could enumerate a
conversation_id could approve another client's pending action.
The frontend threads the token from the tool_request event into the approve
call.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The Synapse backend and memory service bound 0.0.0.0 with wildcard CORS and no
auth, exposing the full unauthenticated admin/data API to the LAN. Default the
uvicorn bind to 127.0.0.1 (NEXUS_BIND_HOST override), scope CORS to known local
origins instead of "*", and add TrustedHostMiddleware to reject foreign Host
headers (which defeats DNS-rebinding, something same-origin CORS cannot stop).
NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS / NEXUS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS allow opt-in LAN exposure, intended
to be paired with real authentication.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Athena
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